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Recent Decisions
as to the delegation of a power, it should be resolved against the
existence of the power) the legislative provision delegating flexible
zoning authority to the planning commissions of only second class
cities and failing to delegate it to any other municipal government,
leads to the conclusion that it was the legislative intention to withhold
such flexibility from the powers of borough planning commissions.
In summary it can be said that several serious questions and prob-
lems are created by the instant decision. By what standards is the New
Hope Borough Planning Commission to determine whether proposed
uses will be approved by it? By what standards is the Commission to
accept or reject proposed density of dwelling units? Suppose the Plan-
ning Commission favors one form of open space over another set
forth in the over-all plan? In brief, the PUD ordinance is completely
devoid of any indication of a standard by which the Planning Com-
mission of New Hope Borough is intended to grant or withhold the
approval authorized by ordinance 160. It is submitted that this ordi-
nance, and court's decision, created possible dangers by granting to a
planning commission the power to thwart arbitrarily a developer's
plan, as well as the power to arbitrarily grant approval without limit
or restraint.
David J. Kozma
TORTS-LANDLORD-TENANT-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
held that a lessor is liable in trespass for non-performance of a promise
to repair which he orally made at the time of execution of the lease.
Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968).
Appellants executed a written lease for a row house property owned by
appellee. When the lease was being negotiated appellants pointed out
the defective condition of the wooden porch floor. At the time of execu-
tion of the lease, and allegedly in consideration thereof, appellee orally
promised to repair the defective portion of the porch. In reliance upon
such promise, appellants executed the lease and took possession of the
premises. Two months after the entry of the appellants, and after alleged
repeated promises to repair by appellee, appellant, Mrs. Reitmeyer,
injured herself in a fall from the defective porch.
Appellants instituted an action in trespass in the Court of Common
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Pleas of Union County by filing a complaint to which defendant filed
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. The preliminary
objections were sustained and the complaint dismissed. On appeal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice Jones writing for the majority
and only Chief Justice Bell dissenting, reversed the lower court and
existing precedent, and found for the appellants.
In considering this case the court focused on one narrow issue:
Is a landlord liable in tort for physical harm to his tenant caused
by a defect in the leased premises which existed, and which the lessor
orally promised to repair, at the time the lease was executed? The first
consideration incumbent upon the court was Harris v. Lewistown Trust
Company,' where thirty-one years ago the court decided on what it
conceded to be "substantially similar facts," that such a promise does
not impose tort liability upon the non-performing landlord. As in the
instant case, the promise there was made at the time the lease was
executed, but was held to be gratuitous.
In opposition to the Harris rule is the view expressed in the Restate-
ment,2 which is considered to be the minority view.3 This view would
impose liability in the Harris situation. While the Restatement specifi-
cally exempts gratuitous promises,4 it does imply that the promise of a
landlord may constitute a contractual obligation. This may be true
even though the promise is not included as a term or covenant of the
lease itself, and even if it is made after entry upon the premises by the
tenant. 5
The situation in Harris was "substantially" the same situation as
faced the court in the instant case. At the time of lease negotiation, the
landlord promised to repair a defective stairway. Thirteen months later
1. 326 Pa. 145, 191 A. 34 (1937).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965), [Hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
A lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his lessee and others
upon the land with the consent of the lessee or his sublessee by a condition of dis-
repair existing before or arising after the lessee has taken possession if
(a) the lessor, as such, has contracted by a covenant in the lease or otherwise to
keep the land in repair, and
(b) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the land which the
performance of the lessor's agreement would have prevented, and
(c) the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to perform his contract.
3. Comment (a) of § 357 of the RESTATEMENT, states that "[t]he rule stated in this
Section has thus far been adopted by only a minority of the American courts, and is still
rejected by a majority of the courts which have considered it."
4. RESTATEMENT § 357 comment (b)l.
5. RESTATEMENT § 357, comment (b)l, which states that "the rule has no application
where there is . . . merely a gratuitous promise to repair, made alter the lessee has
entered into possession. The contract need not, however, be a . . . term of the lease, and
it is sufficient if it is made by the lessor, as such, after possession is transferred."
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the tenant's wife was injured in a fall from that stairway. In a
complete discussion of the applicable law in Pennsylvania, 6 the Harris
court stated that the modern rule opposing tort liability is founded
upon the English case of Pope v. Cavilier.7 Fundamentally this contrary
view is based upon the conclusion that liability in tort should follow
as a legal incident of occupation and control, and that neither occupa-
tion nor control is retained through an agreement to repair.8 Just prior
to the Harris decision there was some apparent confusion as to the
state of the law in this area. The plaintiff in Harris relied upon the
case of Zimmerman v. Homer Building & Loan Association.9 In Zim-
merman the landlord promised and did in fact repair a defective ceiling.
When the ceiling later collapsed the injured tenant successfully sued
for damages. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the lower court's
holding of landlord malfeasance. The court noted, however, that the
promise to repair was in exchange for the tenant's promise to remain.
As such, the exchange could be viewed as an entirely new contract.
The case of Deutsch v. Max10 seemed to add further confusion to the
law in this area. That case involved injuries to the tenant's employee
as a result of an obviously defective condition which the landlord had
promised to repair. While the court considered the condition to be a
nuisance as applied to the employee, the dicta led many to believe that
a landlord was liable in tort to his tenant for failure to perform on a
promise to repair." The court in Harris was again faced with an injured
employee of the tenant. But in Harris the employee was also the wife
of the tenant, and the court believed that a just result could only be
achieved by reversing its holding in the Deutsch case.
If any doubt remained as to the state of the law after Harris, it was
swept away when the court rendered its opinion in Hayden v. National
Bank of Allentown. 12 In speaking of the principles enumerated in
Harris, the court stated that "from them we have no intention to de-
part."'13 In addition to Harris and Hayden the court in the instant case
had to consider that within this same year the dicta in Kolojeski v.
6. 326 Pa. at 147, 191 A. at 35.
7. [1905] 2 K.B. 757.
8. It seems that this view was first expressed in Pennsylvania by the case of Early v.
Ashworth, 17 Phila. R. 248 (1883).
9. 111 Pa. Super. 345, 170 A. 703 (1934).
10. 318 Pa. 450, 172 A. 135 (1934).
11. See 85 U. PA. L. REV. 745 (1937).
12. 331 Pa. 29, 199 A. 218 (1938).
13. Id. at 31, 199 A. at 219.
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Deisher Inc.,4 quoted the opinion in Keiper v. Marquart15 wherein
the Harris rule was again reaffirmed. 6
Notwithstanding the solid foundation upon which Harris was built
and the number of times it was reaffirmed, the court in the instant case
felt compelled to alter its position and adopt the Restatement position.
Section 357 of the Restatement enumerates the situations in which
a lessor may be held liable in tort, one such situation being when "the
lessor, as such, has contracted ... in the lease or otherwise to keep the
land in repair."' 7 The majority in Reitmeyer summarized the reasons
advanced by the Restatement in support of imposing liability upon
lessors,' 8 and in the opinion of the court the reasons advanced were
sound with the possible exception of the fictitious "control" theory.' 9
In the majority's view the Restatement takes the position that while a
landlord retains no right to "control" the use of the land, his agreement
to repair does reserve to him a form of "control" over the premises.
More important, the majority opinion believed that "critical social
and economic changes" have taken place since the time when Harris
was decided. Paramount among these changes was the belief by the
court that a prospective tenant is in a disadvantageous position vis-A-vis
his prospective landlord due to an acute housing shortage. The end
result is the prospective tenant's inability to deal on an "arm's length"
basis.
14. 429 Pa. 191, 194, 239 A.2d 329, 330 (1968).
15. 192 Pa. Super. 88, 91, 159 A.2d 33, 35 (1960). The Keiper court also stated at 192 Pa.
Super. 91, and 159 A.2d 35, that "[i]t is. also settled law that an agreement to repair does
not impose upon the owner a liability in tort at the suit of the tenant; and that occupa-
tion and control are not reserved to the owner by his agreement to repair."
16. The court in the instant case mentioned this in a footnote. See n.7, at 291 of 431
Pa. 284 and at 398 of 243 A.2d 395 where the court stated it thusly: "Unfortunately, in
dicta, this Court very recently in Kolojeski v. Deisher Inc ... quoted with approval
Keiper v. Marquart . . .which reaffirmed the Harris rule. Such dicta should not be
considered as authoritative."
17. RESTATEMENT § 357(a).
18. 431 Pa. at 288-9, 243 A.2d at 397. The court gave five of the reasons advanced by the
Restatement: (1) Tenants who lease premises that are defective are likely to be somewhat
indigent and thus unable to afford to make repairs; (2) because of the "special relation-
ship" between the parties there is the possibility that the tenant will rely on the landlord
to make the necessary repairs; (3) "the landlord retains a form of 'control' over the
premises"; (4) The landlord has a duty based upon a contract which is "cognizable in tort
and the landlord should be liable if his failure to make repairs in accordance with his
undertaking is due to his failure to exercise reasonable care to that end"; (5) since an
apartment can be used safely "only if light and heat is provided and in the lease the land-
lord agrees to provide such service, the landlord should be subject to liability for bodily
harm caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care to make the premises safe."
19. RESTATEMENT § 357, comment (b)3.
The fact that the lessor retains a reversionary interest in the land, and so by his
contract may properly be regarded as retaining or resuming the duty and responsi-
bility of keeping his own premises in safe condition, to the extent of his undertaking.
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Thus, because of the "critical social and economic changes," and the
Restatement's considerable influence upon Pennsylvania courts, 20 it is
not surprising that the court decided to overthrow the Harris rule.
21
It is submitted that the "critical social and economic changes" was
the major factor in leading the court to find for the tenant. Assuming
such changes to be a fact, was that sufficient reason to suddenly decide
that a landlord-to-be and a tenant-to-be no longer deal at "arm's length"?
If the tenant is truly in a disadvantageous position, and the landlord
in fact has all the bargaining power, why then would the landlord feel
compelled to make any promise at all? It is submitted that if these fac-
tors were true, the all-powerful landlord would deal strictly on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis.
Aside from those considerations it seems that the weakness of the in-
stant decision is to be found not so much in the reasoning or rationale of
the majority, but rather in the questions they left unanswered. When the
court adopted the Restatement position that a landlord is liable on his
contract to repair, it has adopted nothing new. The Restatement pre-
supposes the existence of a binding contractual relationship and specif-
ically excludes gratuitous promises.2 2 The question to be answered in
the instant case seemed to be not whether a lessor is liable on his con-
tract, but rather whether a contract in fact existed.
If the majority was determined to find for the appellant it had three
possible alternatives from which to choose: first, the court could have
viewed the landlord's promise as a term of the leasing contract; second,
it could have viewed the landlord's promise as binding because of the
detrimental reliance on the part of the tenant; or third, it could have
found an entirely separate and distinct contract arising out of a promise
to repair in exchange for the tenant's promise to remain in possession.
This frequently is expressed by the courts as a retention of "control" over the premises
by the lessor. The lessor does not, however, retain any right to exclude anyone from
the land, or to control the use of it; and his privilege to enter under his contract
differs from that of any other contractor only in that he agrees to repair his own land,
and stands in a special relation to the lessee.
20. In Florey, The Restatement of Torts in Pennsylvania 1939-1949, 22 PA. B. Ass'N
Q. 79 (1950), the propensity of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to follow not only the
leadership, but in many instances the exact verbage of the Restatement is discussed at
length.
21. See n.5, at 289 of 431 Pa. 284, and at 397-8 of 243 A.2d 395, where the court in
support of its position pointed out that on two occasions prior to Harris, the general rule
exempting landlords from liability had not been followed. Those two occasions according
to the court were Cunningham v. Rogers, 225 Pa. 132, 73 A. 1094 (1909), and Harte v.
Jones, 287 Pa. 37, 134 A. 467 (1926). However, both cases involved the liabilities of a
landlord to third parties as a result of his promise to repair.
22. See note 5, supra.
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In finding the lessor liable, the majority never clearly stated the basis
of its decision. Since the court found it necessary to overrule Harris,2"
it might be assumed that the case turned on the fact that the alleged
promise was a term of the leasing contract. But the court in no instance
specifically found such to be the case.
The majority opinion mentioned that in the allegations, the land-
lord's promise acted as an inducement to the appellant's executing the
lease. 24 The court then proceeded without any further discussion on
that point, and concluded that the landlord can properly be held liable
on his promise. Is it to be assumed that the otherwise gratuitous prom-
ise was made binding because of the appellant's detrimental reliance,
or was there a new contract created, separate and distinct from the
written lease? The court did not seem to make this clear in the instant
opinion.
It is submitted that in either case, the instant situation would be
clearly distinguishable from Harris and thus there would have been no
need to overrule it. It is also submitted that the court could have found
the landlord liable based on a separate contract and still have been
consistent with the Restatement position. In addition, by finding a
separate contract the majority could have relied upon the Zimmerman
case 25 as precedent. By choosing to overrule Harris, the dissent reasoned
that the majority has unnecessarily thrown the law into a state of con-
fusion at the expense of stare decisis. 2 6
In summary it is submitted that what was formerly considered to be
a gratuitous promise has now become a binding contract (or term of a
contract), and without a definite statement as to how the transforma-
tion came about.
James S. Dillman
23. "To the extent that Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co. and Hayden v. Second National
Bank of Allentown are in conflict with the Restatement 2d, Torts, § 357, they are hereby
expressly overruled." 431 Pa. at 291, 243 A.2d at 398.
24. 431 Pa. at 290, 243 A.2d at 398.
25. 111 Pa. Super. 345, 170 A. 703 (1934).
26. Chief Justice Bell in his dissent stated at 293 of 431 Pa. and 399 of 243 A.2d: "What
is the use of talking about Stare Decisis, or increased litigation, or the terrible backlog of
cases, if a majority of this Court bury Stare Decisis at their daily or weekly or monthly
wish or whim?"
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